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 摘  要 
现代公司治理中，独立董事被寄希望于发挥有效的监督治理作用，解决普遍
存在于股东与管理层、控股股东与中小股东、股东与债权人之间的代理问题。在






































In the modern corporate governance mechanism, independent directors are 
expected to play an effect role in monitoring governance, and solve agency problems 
existing widespreadly between shareholders and management, between controlling 
and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and debtholders. In the 
circumstance that companies in most countries or districts seldom revel their board 
meeting decision-making processes to the public, thus the board is also named as a 
black box. Since December 2004, China’s listed companies are compulsively required 
to revel their independent directors’ opinions and reasons for issuing non-unqualified 
opinions on detail matters at board meetings according to rules introduced by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which open the black box to the public. 
From those opinions and additional description words, the public can somewhat judge 
directly whether an independent director is conscientious in monitoring. 
Based on the independent opinions data from A-share companies during 2005 
and 2014, this thesis studies the consequences after a non-unqualified opinion from 
both the firm-level and the individual-level perspective. At the point view of a 
company, this empirical study proves that companies receiving non-unqualified 
opinions in a certain year will show a greater improvement in operating performance, 
have a fewer increments in other receivables, pay more dividends, and exhibit a fewer 
increments in bank loans in the next fiscal year than those receiving unqualified 
opinions from all the independent directors. As for the individual point, by analyzing 
the likelihood of losing the independent director’s position for those who have issued 
non-unqualified opinions, the result show that the risk is higher, especially when the 
degree of non-unqualified opinions is high, too. 
Thus, we can see a distinguished contradiction between the firm and individual 
consequences. On the one hand, the corporate gains goodness due to governance 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the individual issuing a non-unqualified opinion is 
faced with badness like being eliminated reversely. This contradiction makes it 
necessary to think about how to improve current policies. In the perspective of policy 
makers, they can get a positive feedback from governance effectiveness, which 
supports the improvement direction of enhancing information disclosure and 
multi-aspect monitoring. Furthermore, the contradiction of goodness and badness 
makes it very necessary to reform the independent director election policy to ensure 
independent directors accomplish their duties safely and diligently. 
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冲突问题（Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997），这也是各个经
济体所面临的典型、普遍的代理问题。第二类代理问题是由于所有权与控制权的
分离，导致控股股东与中小股东之间存在利益冲突。与 Berle et al.（1932）和 Jensen 
and Meckling（1976）认为的现代公司拥有分散股权结构不同，Shleifer and Vishny
（1986）和 Morck et al.（1988）发现即使在美国的大型公司中也存在一定程度





益来增加自身的利益，被称为“自我交易”（self-dealing）（Djancov et al., 2008）
或“隧道”（tunneling）（Johnson et al., 2000）。第三类代理问题是主要存在于股
东与债权人之间的利益冲突，因为股东（或其代表）做出的决策可能导致财富从
债权人向股东转移（肖作平、廖理，2007），典型地表现为资产替代效应（Jensen 
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